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There is a large literature showing that the self employed underreport their income to tax authorities.
In this paper, we quantify the extent to which the self employed systematically underreport their income
to U.S. household surveys.  To do so, we use the Engel curve describing the relationship between income
and expenditures of wage and salary workers to infer the actual income, and thus the reporting gap,
of the self employed based on their reported expenditures. We find that the self employed underreport
their income by about 30 percent.   This result is remarkably robust across data sources and alternative
model specifications.  Aside from transportation expenditures, we find little evidence that the self
employed misreport their expenditures to household surveys. We show that failing to account for such
income underreporting leads to biased conclusions when comparing the earnings and saving behavior
between the self employed and other workers as well as biased estimates of the importance of precautionary
savings, the shape of lifecycle earnings profiles, and the magnitude of earnings differences across
MSAs.  Finally, our results show that it is naive for researcher to take it for granted that individuals
will provide unbiased information to household surveys when they are simultaneously providing distorted
information to other administrative sources.
Erik Hurst
Booth School of Business
University of Chicago
Harper Center
















There is an abundance of evidence that finds that some individuals systematically underreport 
their incomes to tax authorities.
1  Likewise, there is a sizeable literature showing that some participants in 
experiments will distort their behavior as a reaction to being studied.
2  There is also evidence that some 
other types of administrative data, including Vital Statistics data, are not immune from potential problems 
of misreporting.
3   Collectively, these literatures show that individuals tend to misreport their actual 
behavior to data collectors and administrative agencies when the incentives to do so are sufficiently large 
(e.g., to avoid tax payments) and/or the cost of doing so is small (e.g., changing their behavior in 
experimental settings).   
An implicit assumption made in nearly all empirical work using household survey data, however, 
is that the data within the household surveys are immune to such systematic errors.
4   In doing so, 
researchers are assuming that the problems that plague tax data, experimental data, and other types of 
administrative data do not plague household survey data.  In this paper, we set out to address whether 
such an assumption is valid.  Specifically, we address whether the self employed, who have been shown 
to have misreported their income to tax authorities, have also misreported their income to household 
surveys.  We ask whether household surveys are akin to other types of data sources where systematic 
measurement errors can undermine data quality. 
 A natural question that arises is why would any individual purposefully misreport their earnings 
to household surveys?  On the one hand, there is very little direct benefit for an individual to underreport 
their income to household surveys.  Unlike when reporting to tax authorities, misreporting income to 
                                                            
1  See, for example, Clotfelter (1983), Slemrod (1985),  Feinstein (1991), Andreoni et al. (1998), Slemrod (2007), 
and Feldman and Slemrod (2007). 
2   This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the Hawthorne Effect, named for a series of studies at the 
Hawthorne Works factory where workers’ productivity initially improved while under observation but declined soon 
after. There is a large literature within the social sciences on the Hawthorne Effect. See Levitt and List (2009) for a 
recent discussion. 
3  For example, Blank et al. (2009) compares administrative data from Vital Statistic records to data from the U.S. 
Census to show that in states where minimum age of marriage laws were binding, younger individuals appeared to 
have lied about their age to government officials when applying for their marriage license.   
4 There is an important literature examining measurement error in household surveys.   We briefly discuss some of 
this literature below.   When doing so, we discuss how our results contribute to this literature.  
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household surveys does not lessen the individual's tax burden.  On the other hand, there is also essentially 
no penalty associated with misreporting income to household surveys.   
However, individuals, particularly the self employed, may have other indirect net benefits 
associated with underreporting their income to household surveys. First, households may feel compelled 
to provide consistent measures of their income to household surveys if they believe that their reports to 
the household survey may not be completely confidential. Given that the self employed already have 
strong incentives to misreport their income to tax authorities and given that they face no penalty for 
misreporting to household surveys, even a small probability of self-incrimination may be enough to 
distort their survey responses. Second, unlike wage and salary employees who receive W-2 forms, the self 
employed have to expend effort to accurately account for their true income. If the self employed have 
already supplied a falsified report to tax authorities, it may simply be easier to reuse this report when 
responding to household surveys as opposed to computing an accurate one. With no penalty compelling 
an accurate response and potential net benefits from providing a distorted one, economic theory predicts 
that households, particularly those who already underreport their income to a tax authority, have 
incentives to also underreport their income to household surveys. The extent of underreporting of income 
to household surveys, therefore, becomes an empirical question. 
We focus our attention on the self employed for two reasons.  First, as noted above, there is a 
large literature showing that this group consistently and substantially underreports their income to the tax 
authorities.  For example, for tax years 1985, 1988, and 1992, IRS random audits suggest that roughly 30-
35 percent of nonfarm proprietor income was underreported.
5  The degree of underreporting was even 
higher in recent years when the IRS estimated that 57 percent of nonfarm proprietor income was 
underreported in tax year 2001.
6  Second, the self employed are a non-trivial fraction of household survey 
participants. They comprise between 10 and 14 percent of a sample of prime age working males, and 
                                                            
5   Source: “Individual Income Tax Gap Estimates for 1985, 1988, and 1992” which can be found at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/p141596.pdf.   
6  Source: “Reducing the Federal Tax Gap:  A Report on Improving Voluntary Compliance” which can be found at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_report_final_080207_linked.pdf.    
  
 
some surveys even over-sample the self employed.
7  Furthermore, self employment propensities differ 
markedly over the lifecycle, across gender and race, and across geographic areas.  Consequently, as we 
show below, the extent to which the self employed underreport their income has quantitatively important 
effects on many different types of questions addressed in empirical economics using household survey 
data.    
Our goals in this paper are threefold.  First, we will infer the extent to which income is 
underreported by the self employed within U.S. household surveys.  As far as we know, this is the first 
paper that attempts to do so.  To estimate the extent of underreporting, we follow a procedure similar to 
the one set forth in Pissarides and Weber (1989).  This procedure estimates the relationship between 
expenditures and income for wage and salary workers and uses the estimated coefficients from this 
relationship to predict the income of the self employed based on their reported level of expenditures.  
Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we find 
that the self employed underreport their income to household surveys by about 30 percent.  These 
magnitudes are nearly identical across both surveys for similarly defined specifications.   
The above procedure makes a few key assumptions.  First, it assumes no differential 
underreporting of expenditures by the self employed relative to wage and salary workers.  Second, it 
assumes that the conceptual measures of income in household surveys are similar between wage and 
salary workers and the self employed.   Finally, it assumes that the underlying relationship between 
income and expenditures, absent any underreporting, is similar between wage and salary workers and the 
self employed.  We discuss the validity of all of these assumptions, as well as provide a variety of 
additional robustness specifications, in later sections.    
The second goal of the paper is to assess whether the extent of the underreporting of income 
correlates with observable economic or demographic characteristics.  Research using data from actual tax 
returns finds that individuals are more likely to underreport their income when marginal tax rates are 
higher (Clotfelter, 1983) and that the self employed in professional industries are less likely to 
                                                            
7 For example, the share of households surveyed in the Survey of Consumer Finances that are self employed is
significantly higher than the nation average, partly due to the survey's oversampling of the high-income households.
 
                                                                                               ϯ 
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underreport their income relative to those in non-professional industries (Andreoni et al., 1998).   
Additionally, understanding both the extent of underreporting and whether the underreporting is 
correlated with observables is important for gauging when and how ignoring the underreporting could 
potentially bias different analyses.  We do find greater estimated underreporting of income in the early 
part of our sample (prior to 1986) when marginal tax rates were higher relative to later parts of the 
sample.  We also find evidence that the self employed with advanced degrees tend to underreport their 
income to household surveys to a much less extent.   
The third and final goal of the paper is to show several examples of how ignoring the 
underreporting of income by the self employed can bias many different types of empirical analyses.  Not 
surprisingly, we show that studies that focus on earnings or savings differences between the self 
employed and wage and salary workers are severely biased if the underreporting of income by the self 
employed is not accounted for.  For example, Hamilton (2000) finds that the earnings of the self 
employed are 35 percent lower than that of otherwise similar wage and salary workers.  From this finding, 
he concludes that there are substantial non pecuniary benefits to self employment.  However, accounting 
for the underreporting of income by the self employed dramatically reduces the earnings gaps estimated 
by Hamilton.  Additionally, we show that adjusting for the misreporting of income by the self employed 
reduces the wealth gaps (conditional on earnings and demographics) between the self employed and wage 
and salary workers by roughly one third. 
Moreover, we show that not accounting for the underreporting of income by the self employed 
can lead to quantitatively different results in a variety of other settings.  For example, we show that 
estimated results on the importance of precautionary savings are 13 percent lower when we account the 
extent to which the self employed underreport their income.  Similarly, given that self employment 
propensities differ over the lifecycle and across space, measures of lifecycle and spatial differences in 
earnings are sensitive to the extent of underreporting of income by the self employed.  For example, we 
find that roughly between 5 and 10 percent of the decline in earnings between the ages of 45 and 65 in the  
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Consumer Expenditure Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics can be explained by the 
underreporting of income by the self employed. 
Our work in this paper complements two different literatures.  First, there is an important existing 
literature that looks at reporting errors within household surveys.
8  For example, Bound et al. (1994) 
explore the extent to which classical measurement error is important for reported wage and earnings data 
in household surveys.  Fitzgerald et al. (1998) examines the nature of survey attrition from household 
survey panels.  Haider and Solon (2006) show that deviations between current and permanent income 
change over the lifecycle.  Meyer et al.  (2009) documents the extent to which transfer income is 
underreported in household surveys.  Aguiar and Bils (2010) looks at differences in the underreporting of 
expenditures by different groups within household surveys and shows that these differences have been 
changing over time.  Deaton (1997) outlines many potential data problems that could arise when using 
household surveys for empirical analysis. Our work adds to this literature by identifying another channel 
for reporting errors. We find that a large group of individuals, the self employed, systematically 
underreport their income to household surveys.  Additionally, we show that the same misreporting issues 
that appear in non-survey settings may also pass through to household survey responses.  
Second, our work complements the large existing literature that estimates the extent of 
underreporting of income by the self employed using data on actual tax returns.  Much of the work on the 
underreporting of income to tax authorities comes from the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program 
(TCMP) and the recent National Research Program (NRP).  The TCMP and NRP are a stratified random 
sample of U.S. individual federal income tax returns that are subject to thorough examination by 
experienced IRS tax examiners.
9  A separate strand of research uses data from actual tax returns (as 
opposed to random audits) to assess the amount of underreporting of income.  For example,  Feldman and 
Slemrod (2007) uses tax return data from 1999 to estimate the relationship between charitable giving and 
                                                            
8 Bound et al. (2001) surveys nearly fifty years of research examining the extent to which household survey data is 
measured with error.   
9 There is much work using the TCMP and NRP data to assess the underreporting of income on U.S. tax returns.  
For a summary of this literature, see the recent surveys by Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod (2007).  
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income for those with only wage and salary income.  Again, our study differs from theirs in that we 
analyze the underreporting of income by the self employed to household surveys as opposed to tax 
authorities.
10 
  Collectively, our work shows that it is naive for researchers to assume that individuals who are 
willing to misconstrue their behavior to other types of data sources would automatically provide accurate 
responses when participating in household surveys.  While it is likely true that the benefits of providing 
distorted information to household surveys are small, it is also likely that the benefits of providing 
accurate information are also small.  Such potential biases need to be accounted for when interpreting 
data from household surveys.    
 
2.  Data Description:  CE, PSID and CPS 
  We use two nationwide representative household surveys, the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CE) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), for the majority of our empirical analysis.  To 
explore the quality of income data within both surveys, we also supplement our analysis with data from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS).  In this section, we describe all three of the surveys and discuss our 
sample selection criteria.  The Data Appendix provides background information on all three data sources. 
 
2A.  The CE Sample 
To construct our sample, we start with the NBER CE extracts which pool together all the waves 
between 1980 and 2003.
11  We restrict the sample to households who report expenditures in all four 
quarters of the survey and sum the four quarterly responses to calculate an annual expenditure measure.  
                                                            
10 Several authors have examined the underreporting of income by the self employed within household surveys from 
other countries.  For example, Pissarides and Weber (1989) uses their expenditure based method to detect the 
underreporting of income by the self employed within Britain’s 1982 Family Expenditure Survey.   They find that 
the self employed underreported their income by roughly 35 percent within Britain in 1982.  Using a similar 
methodology, Johansson (2005) finds that the self employed underreport their income by 16-40 percent in Finland, 
Schuetze (2002) finds 17 percent underreporting in Canada, and  Gibson, Kim, and Chung (2009) find roughly 40 
and 50 percent underreporting in Korea and Russian, respectively.   Gorodnichenko et al (2009) uses household 
expenditure data and changes in national tax policy to examine the extent to which taxes are evaded in Russia. 
11  See http://www.nber.org/data/ces_cbo.html for details on the NBER CE extracts.  
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We further restrict the sample to include only the households that have a male head between the ages of 
25 and 55 (inclusive), and where the head reports currently working at least 30 hours in an average week 
and has worked at least 40 weeks during the previous year.
12  These latter restrictions ensure that we focus 
on prime age individuals who are working full time.  To avoid some ambiguities in classifying 
households, we further exclude any households where the male head is a wage and salary worker but the 
spouse (if present) was self employed.
13  We also restrict the sample by excluding any household who 
reported a positive amount of farm income.  We exclude farmers because the relationship between income 
and food expenditures may differ for individuals who grow some of their own food.  Finally, we exclude 
households with zero or negative reported measures of household income or zero reported measures of 
household expenditures.
14   
In the work below, we explore how the relationship between income and expenditures for wage 
and salary workers compares to the relationship between income and expenditures for the self employed.  
We define three measures of expenditures and two measures of income using the CE data.  The three 
expenditure measures we explore are:  total food expenditures, total nondurable expenditures, and total 
expenditures. Total food expenditure includes expenditures on food consumed at home as well as 
expenditures on food consumed away from home.  Following Aguiar and Hurst (2009), we define 
nondurable expenditures to include spending on food, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, clothing and personal 
care, housing services, utilities, domestic care services, nondurable transportation, nondurable 
entertainment, and “other” nondurable expenditures.  For a full definition of each of these categories, see 
                                                            
12  Male heads are indentified as those male individuals who self report themselves as being a head or, to be 
consistent with the PSID, those males who are married to someone who reports themselves as being a head. 
13  Within the CE, there are only 859 households where the male household head is working full time but is not self 
employed but the spouse within the household was self employed after satisfying all other sample restrictions. This 
constitutes 3.1 percent of the CE sample.  Our results are not sensitive to whether or not we include such households 
within our self employed or wage and salary worker sample.  For the results below, we simply exclude from our 
analysis all households where the wife is self employed (conditional on a wife being in the household) and the 
husband is not. 
14  This last restriction is not overly binding.  Given the other sample restrictions, only about 0.5 percent of our 
sample had missing income measures.  All remaining households had positive expenditures measures.   
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Aguiar and Hurst (2009).
15  Our total expenditure measure is the CE's measure of total household outlays 
including spending on nondurables, durables, education, health care, and other household outlays.  
Throughout the paper, we use two different measures of household income.  For our first measure 
of household income, we include the sum of all labor earnings from wage and salary employment plus all 
earnings generated by one's business.  For business earnings, we include both the return to labor and the 
return to capital.
16  When creating this income measure, we include both the earnings of the male heads 
and their spouses (if a spouse was present).  Our second measure of household income is total family 
income, which includes all earnings, asset income, and transfer income received by the household.  This 
latter measure is the total amount of pre-tax resources that flow into the household during a given year 
that can be allocated to consumption.  
There are pros and cons for each of the income measures.  According to standard theories of 
consumption, household expenditures are determined by the present value of household resources earned 
over their lifetime.  In this sense, it is appropriate to account for the returns accrued to both labor and 
capital.  Accounting for asset income is potentially even more important in our analysis given that it is 
well documented that the self employed have much higher levels of assets than wage and salary workers 
that can be used to fund current expenditures.
17  However, asset levels, and consequently asset income, 
are in part determined by household preferences, the same preferences that determine household 
consumption behavior.  We show below that these potential endogeneity concerns have only a limited 
effect on our results.  Indeed, our estimates of the underreporting of income by the self employed are 
quantitatively similar regardless of the measure of income we use.   
                                                            
15  Following Aguiar and Hurst (2009), we do not include health and education expenditures in our nondurable 
goods expenditure measure.   
16 The fact that both the return to business labor and the return to business capital is combined together in our base 
measure of earnings is done out of necessity.  The CE does not separately distinguish between the two components 
of business income.  A similar decision is made with respect to the PSID data (described below).  While the PSID 
does attempt to distinguish business labor income from business capital income, such a distinction is imputed for 
most households. 
17  See Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and the references cited within.  
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  Finally, within the CE, all workers are asked to classify their employment type as either working 
for someone else in the private sector, working for the government, or being self employed.  We define a 
self employed household as one where the male head reports their primary employment type as being self 
employed.  We refer to all remaining households with a working male heads as being wage and salary 
workers.  Our final sample includes 27,219 households, of which 2,508 are self employed.   
 
2B.  The PSID Sample 
Compared with the CE, the PSID only collects limited information on household expenditures.  
Over the period of our analysis, the only expenditure category that is measured with any consistency is 
food expenditures.  When computing PSID food expenditures, we sum together expenditures on food 
consumed at home with food consumed away from home.  We define our two measures of household 
income in a way similar to how they are defined within the CE.   
We use the PSID data only from 1980 to 1997 except the 1988 and 1989 waves, during which 
food expenditures were not collected.  We do not use the PSID data after 1997 because the PSID started 
collecting data biannually after 1997.  Prior to 1997, we can match food expenditures and income more 
closely.  The way the PSID is set up, during a given survey year, households are asked to report their 
current weekly or monthly food expenditures and they are asked to provide extensive information about 
the income earned during the previous calendar year.  As a result, we match the income reported by the 
household during survey year t+1 with the food expenditures reported by the household during survey 
year t, which is the standard approach in the literature.
18 
Similar to the CE sample construction discussed above, we restrict the PSID sample to those 
households with positive food expenditure during a given year, whose heads are male between the ages of 
25 and 55 (inclusive), report working for pay, report working at least 30 hours in an average week, and 
                                                            
18  See, for example, Zeldes (1989).  
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report having worked at least 40 weeks during the year in which food expenditures are measured.
19  As 
with the CE data, we also exclude households with zero or negative measures of household income.  
Lastly, we exclude all households where the head is a wage and salary worker but the spouse (if present) 
was self employed.
20   
Within the PSID, individuals are asked to report whether on their main job they “are self 
employed” or “employed by someone else.”  Individuals can report being only employed by someone 
else, only self employed, or both employed by someone else and self employed.  We define self employed 
households as being a household where the male head reports being self employed only.  Wage and salary 
households are defined as ones where the male head reports only working for someone else.  Again, for 
simplicity, we exclude households who report being both self employed and working for someone else 
from our analysis.  None of our results are sensitive to whether these households are included or excluded 
from the analysis.  Finally, after applying these restrictions, our sample has 33,339 households, 4,140 of 
which are self employed.  
 
2C.  The CPS Sample 
To assess the quality of the income data within the CE and PSID, we supplement our analysis 
with data from the March Annual Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS).  The CPS is a 
monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  It is the primary source of labor force characteristics of the U.S. population.  
For our analysis, we use data from the March Annual Supplement to the CPS for the years 1980-2003.  
Participating households in March answer additional detailed questions about their annual income and 
                                                            
19 Because the PSID is a longitudinal survey, we are able to restrict the sample to those whose head had worked at 
least 40 weeks in the year during which the expenditure occurred.  In contrast, in the CE sample, the annual working 
week restriction refers to the number of weeks in the year prior to expenditure. 
20 After making the other sample restrictions, there are only about 3 percent of households where the male was not 
self employed but the wife was self employed. As with the CE results, our results are not sensitive to how we 
classify such households.  For simplicity, we exclude them from our analysis.  
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employment in the previous calendar year.  We define the CPS sample to match the PSID and CE 
samples.
21   
 
3.  Income and Expenditure Differences between Wage Workers and the Self Employed 
  In this section, we present descriptive results on how the income and expenditure of the self 
employed compare with those of the wage and salary workers.  These data will form the basis of our 
formal empirical tests in the subsequent sections.  We find that, conditional on demographics, the self 
employed tend to have lower levels of income while simultaneously having greater expenditures.  In what 
follows, we first convert all income and expenditure measures to year 2000 dollars using the Consumer 
Price Index and express them in log levels. We compute all estimates using the sampling weights of the 
respective surveys.  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics separately for wage and salary workers and the self employed 
within the CE, PSID, and CPS samples.  The table is divided into three panels.  In panels A and B, 
respectively, we show statistics of the log real household income and expenditure measures.  The PSID 
only has limited expenditure information and the CPS has no information on expenditure.  In panel C, we 
show other descriptive statistics. The table shows that the differences in the unconditional averages 
between wage and salary workers and the self employed are mostly consistent across surveys.   
Noticeably, on average, the self employed have a somewhat higher level of total family income relative to 
wage and salary workers, but even greater differences across each measure of expenditures.  Across all 
surveys, the self employed are older, more likely to be married, better educated, and on average work 11 
to 12 percent more annual hours. The difference in hours worked is notable and we will return to it when 
we address whether the expenditure differences could be driven by varying tastes for leisure or difference 
in home production needs for the self employed.  On balance, these demographic characteristics are 
strikingly similar across surveys.  As we show below, the demographic composition identified in each of 
the samples explains much of  the higher income of the self employed.   
                                                            
21 The data appendix details the exact sample selection criteria.  
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  Next, we partial out all of the differences explained by the different demographic characteristics 
and examine the conditional differences in measures of income and expenditures. To find these 
conditional differences we approximate the conditional expectations of income and expenditures by 
estimating the regression models  
  01 ' log
y yy y y
it it it t it D yX           (1) 
and 
  01 log ' ,
cc c cc
it it t it it DX c         (2) 
where  it y  and  it c  indicate real measures of income and expenditure of household i in year t,  it D  is a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not i is self employed in year t,  it X  is a vector of demographic 
controls,  µt is a time fixed effect, and the  it    terms are orthogonal prediction errors. The vector of 
household controls include:  a series of five-year age dummies, four dummies indicating the education of 
the household head (exactly high school, some college, exactly college, and more than college; less than 
high school was omitted), a dummy if the household head was black, a dummy if the household head was 
married, and a series of family size dummies.   
  The conditional differences in income and expenditure line up rather closely across the three 
surveys.  Tables 2 and 3 show the estimated conditional differences in income and expenditure 
respectively across each survey.  As seen from Table 2, conditional on demographic differences, the self 
employed typically have lower income than wage and salary workers.  Controlling for the compositional 
differences between the groups makes the results closer across surveys than the unconditional differences 
shown in Table 1.  For example, for labor earnings plus business income, the self employed earn 10 
percent and 11 percent less than their wage and salary worker counterparts with the same demographic 
characteristics, respectively, within the CE and CPS samples.
22  The gaps are largely similar for total 
                                                            
22  The results in Table 2 show differences in earnings between the self employed and wage and salary workers.  As 
shown in Table 1, the self employed also work more than wage and salary workers.  Given this, the difference in the 
average log hourly wage rate between the self employed and wage and salary workers is much lower than what is  
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family income in that the self employed earn 8 percent less and 7 percent less, respectively, within the CE 
and the CPS.  However, total family income of the self employed is on average 7 percent higher than the 
wage and salary workers in the PSID sample.  
  In Table 3, we show the estimates from equation (2). While the self employed, all else equal, 
generally reported earning less income than wage and salary workers, they also reported spending 
substantially more than wage and salary workers.  Specifically, within the CE, the conditional differences 
show that the self employed reported spending roughly 12 percent more on food, 13 percent more on 
nondurable expenditures, and 16 percent more on total expenditure.  The conditional expenditure 
differences are nearly identical between the PSID and CE. 
  These purely descriptive measures of income and expenditure reveal an inconsistency.  Across  
alternative household surveys, the self employed simultaneously earn less and consume more than their 
wage and salary counterparts.  To determine whether underreporting in income by the self employed can 
account for the inconsistency we further examine the relationship between income and expenditure in 
both groups. 
 
4.  Detecting the Underreporting of Income of the Self Employed 
  In this section, we first examine, assuming income reports are accurate, how the conditional 
relationship between income and expenditures differs across the self employed and wage and salary 
workers.  Previewing our results, we find a similar relationship for both the self employed and wage and 
salary workers except for a gap in levels of predicted expenditures. Income underreporting is one 
straightforward explanation of the gap.  By relaxing the accurate reporting assumption, we propose a 
method closely related to Pissarides and Weber (1989) to use the vertical distances in the Engel curves to 
infer whether, and by how much, the self employed underreport their income relative to wage and salary 
workers.  We use this method in Section 5 to quantify the extent of underreporting by the self employed. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
shown in Table 2.  Controlling for hours increases the differences in earnings between the self employed and wage 
and salary workers in all of our specifications.  
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Later, in Section 6 we show that the method is robust to a number of alternative model specifications that 
take into account other possible explanations for the expenditure gap. 
Our central theme in understanding the conditional structural relationship between income and 
expenditure is the log-linear Engel curve.  Our first goal is to understand whether the self employed and 
wage and salary workers have a substantially different relationship between income and expenditures.  
For each group, k , where k  indicates either self employed (kS  ) or wage and salary (kW  ), we 
separately estimate log-linear Engel curves using alternative measures of income and expenditures.  Here 
we assume that each household i has preferences that, when conditioned on our set of controls, are such 
that the intertemporal optimization, at least to a first order approximation, generates Engel curves of the 
following form: 
  ln ln '
p
ikt k k ikt k ikt kt ikt cy X        (3) 
where  k   is the income elasticity,  ikt X  is our previously defined vector of controls less any education 
dummies, and  ikt   represents the cumulative effects of other unobserved determinants of the household’s 
consumption.  Here, we assume that households are able to borrow and lend in asset markets so that it is 
the permanent component of income, 
p
ikt y  , that determines the household’s consumption, as is standard 
in modern theories of consumption.
23  
  Estimating (3)  directly is of course problematic because even if the household’s annual income 
reported to the CE and PSID were completely accurate it would only by chance coincide with
p
ikt y .
24  The 
                                                            
23 We do not require that markets are complete, only that the household is able to save and borrow in some form 
sufficient to support a lifetime budget constraint in expected value.  In section 6, we explore whether differential 
liquidity constraints between the two groups can explain the patterns we see in the data. 
24 Given the nature of the PSID data, we could have exploited the panel nature of the PSID to construct a multi-year 
average income measure.  In a prior draft of this paper, we did just that.  We made a 3-year average income and 
expenditure PSID sample.  Using that sample, we regressed log three year average food expenditure on three year 
average income, our vector of controls X, and the time dummies.  The results from the three year average PSID 
sample and the instrumented version of  (5) below using the one year PSID sample were nearly identical.  As a 
result, to save space, we only show here the results using the one year PSID samples.  However, if one is interested 
in the three year average results, they are available upon request from the authors.  
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household’s annual income represents both 
p
ikt y   and a transitory component.  Here we label the 
household’s income report  ikt y   and assume for the moment that all households accurately report their 
current income,  ikt y , which we model as    exp '
p
ikt ikt k ikt ikt yy X     so that: 
  nl ' ln ,
p
ikt it k ikt ikt y yX      (4) 
where  ' ki k t X   and  ikt    represent respectively the predictable and unpredictable components of 
transitory income.  We assume that the unpredictable component,  ikt   , is orthogonal to both the controls 
ikt X   and any unobserved determinants of the household’s consumption  ikt   (i.e.,  [] 0 ikt ikt EX   and 
[ ] 0). ikt ikt E     Rewriting (3) in terms of (4) implies: 
  ' ln ln , ikt k k ikt k ikt ikt cy X        (5) 
where   kk k k     and  ikt ikt k ikt     .   Even with accurate income reports, the transitory 
income introduces attenuation bias in our estimation of  k    from (5) since, by construction,
[ln ] 0 ikt ikt Ey   .  To mitigate the effects of measurement error in our estimation of equation (5), we 
instrument for  ikt y  using educational attainment dummies.  As is the usual case, the education dummies 
are highly predictive of household reported annual income in the first stage regressions.   
Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot simple income-expenditure Engel curves estimated separately for the two 
groups.  Figure 1 shows the results using CE data where nondurable expenditure is used as the 
expenditure measure.  Figure 2 shows the results using CE data where food expenditure is the expenditure 
measure.  Figure 3 shows the results using PSID data.  In all three of these figures, the measure of income 
is household total family income.  To facilitate comparison, for each figure, we show the predictive 
relationship between income and expenditure estimated by OLS and by 2SLS instrumenting for ln ikt y .   
16 
 
  A few things are of note of the estimated Engel curves shown in Figures 1-3.
25  First, for all 
specifications, the Engel curve for the self employed lies strictly above the Engel curve for the wage and 
salary workers over essentially the entire support of the data.  In other words, for a given amount of 
income, the self employed spend more on both food and total nondurable expenditures than the wage and 
salary workers.  These are consistent with the descriptive results in Tables 1-3.   
Second, for the IV specifications, the slopes of the Engel curves for the wage and salary workers 
are roughly similar to the slopes for the self employed.  For example, for food expenditures in the CE, the 
estimated income elasticities for the self employed and for the wage and salary workers are 0.38 and 0.40, 
respectively (Figure 2).  The comparable income elasticities using food expenditures in the PSID were 
0.31 and 0.32, respectively (Figure 3).     The  differences in income elasticities were somewhat bigger 
using CE nondurable expenditure data (0.51 and 0.61, respectively).  When we constrain the effect of 
covariates to be the same across groups, we find these slopes to be statistically indistinguishable across 
groups.  Although we only show the figures using total family income as our income measure, the results 
are nearly identical if we use labor plus business income as our income measure.     
  Collectively, the above descriptive results suggest that if income reports in the surveys are 
accurate, the self employed consume substantially more than wage and salary workers. We now outline a 
very simple model that relaxes the assumption of accurate reporting of income and allows us to estimate 
the magnitude of underreporting by the self employed.  
  We begin with the same household preferences and market arrangements that generate the log-
linear Engel curve described by (3).  However, now we relax our earlier assumption of accurate income 
reporting to allow for the possibility of misreporting of income by the self employed.  For households of 
each type, we now assume their income reports to the household surveys are determined by  
  ln ln '
p
iWt iWt W iWt iWt yX y      (6) 
  ln ln ln
p
iSt S iSt S iSt iSt yX y        (7) 
                                                            
25 To plot the Engel curves, we evaluate our estimate of (5) using means of pooled self employed and wage and 
salary workers for each sample.    
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For each group, we assume that the observed income in any time period, ikt y , is a noisy proxy of 
permanent income, where   ikt   includes both any classical measurement error in the income report and 
the unpredictable component of transient variation around permanent income.  As before, we assume that 
ν has mean zero and is orthogonal to the unobserved determinants of log expenditure, ε.    
Equations (6) and (7) embed two additional assumptions.  First, we assume that self employed 
households (k = S) systematically misreport their earnings by a factor,  S  . Although we do not impose 
that  1 S   , our empirical estimates below reveal that, in fact,  1 S   .  For now, we assume that κS is 
constant across self employed households.
26   Second, we assume that the wage and salary workers 
provide a systematically unbiased report of their income to household surveys i.e., 1 W   . This 
assumption is not overly restrictive.  If wage and salary household also systematically mis-report their 
income to household surveys, κS would be an estimate of the differential systematic underreporting by the 
self employed. 
  The goal of this section is to provide a method to estimate  S  .  In order to do so, we also assume 
that the estimated parameters of the two Engel curves are constant between the self employed and the 
wage and salary workers.  This amounts to imposing that  WS    ,  WS    ,  WS  ,  and 
WS   .  As seen in Figures 1-3, the slopes of the income-expenditure Engel curves do not differ 
dramatically between the two groups so this assumption is not at odds with the underlying data.
27  Lastly, 
we assume that household expenditures are not differentially misreported between the two groups.  This 
amounts to assuming that if the self employed under or over report their expenditures systematically, the 
wage and salary workers under or over report their expenditures systematically by the same amount.  We 
provide evidence for this assumption in Section 6.   
                                                            
26  Later in the paper, we explore how κ varies across different demographic groups and across different tax regimes. 
27 Moreover, we cannot reject equality of the coefficients on the vector of controls between the two groups.   
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  Given these assumptions, we can estimate of  S  via the following expression formed from 
combining (5) with (6)  and (7) 
  ln log , it ikt ikt ikt ik tt cy D X           (8) 
  
where D is again a dummy variable indicating whether the household head is self employed. As before 
'    and the unobserved determinants are expressed as  ikt ikt ikt      . The fraction of 
income reported by the self employed,  S  , is identified as exp( / )   , and we form the estimate  ˆS   as 
ˆ ˆ exp( / )     using the estimated coefficients from equation (8).  We will often express our results in 
terms of the amount that the self employed underreport their income to household surveys which can be 
defined as 1- ˆS  . 
  When estimating (8) using the pooled sample, we again instrument for reported ln ikt y  using the 
set of education dummies. Estimating (8) with OLS would underestimate the income elasticity of 
consumption β and hence overestimate  .  
  To summarize, our main identifying assumptions are: 1) household’s preferences are such that log 
household expenditures can be expressed as a linear function of log household permanent income 
conditional on our control set,  2) self employed households underreport their true income by an unknown 
factor,  S  ,  to household surveys relative to wage and salary workers, 3) expenditures are not 
differentially over or underreported between the two groups, 4) the underlying relationship between 
income and expenditures—absent the underreporting of income by the self employed—is similar between 
wage and salary workers and the self employed and 6) a set of education dummies is a valid instrument 
for the permanent component of household income.    
  In section 6, we assess in greater detail two of the above assumptions.  First, we provide evidence 
in support of the assumption that there are no systematic differences in the measurement of expenditures 
between the two groups within household surveys.  Second, aside from underreporting, we discuss and 
rule out several alternative explanations for the excessive expenditures of the self employed.   
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5.  Estimating the Missing Income using Expenditures 
  In this section, we show the base results from estimating (8).  Table 4 shows our estimates of both 
β and γ from equation (8)  using different measures of expenditures separately for the CE and PSID 
samples.  For comparison, we show both the OLS and IV results.  Also, we separately show the results 
where we use total family income and household labor plus business income as our measure of household 
income.  Remember that β estimates the slope of the income-expenditure log-linear Engel curves pooled 
across the two groups while γ estimates the average intercept gap between the log-linear Engel curves of 
the self employed relative to the wage and salary workers. A positive value of γ implies that, conditional 
on a given amount of reported income, expenditures for the self employed are higher than the 
expenditures of the wage and salary workers.   
  As seen from Table 4, across all expenditure measures and across both surveys, estimates of γ are 
positive and statistically different from zero (shown in panel B).  For example, using the CE sample and 
using the nondurable expenditure measure, we estimate that the self employed spend 18 percent more 
than wage and salary workers with similar reported income.  The estimates of γ are roughly similar 
whether or not we instrument for annual income.  Moreover, the estimates are similar regardless of 
whether we use total family income or labor plus business income as our income measure.  Finally, the 
estimates of γ for food expenditures are similar between the PSID and CE samples.  For example, using 
the IV specification and focusing on labor plus business income, the estimate of γ in the CE sample was 
0.15 (standard error = 0.01) while the estimate of γ in the PSID was 0.11 (standard error = 0.01). 
  The estimates of β from (8) are shown in Panel A of Table 4 and are similar to those shown in 
Figures 1-3.  Not surprisingly, given the existence of transitory variation around permanent income, in 
addition to measurement error in annual income, the estimates of β are sensitive to whether we estimate 
(7) via OLS or IV.  The fact that current reported income is a noisy proxy of permanent income attenuates 
the estimated expenditure income elasticities.  In all cases, the IV estimates of β are higher than the OLS 
estimates of β.  Furthermore, the difference between the OLS and IV estimates is larger in the CE 
specifications relative to the PSID specifications.  This is consistent with the fact that income within the  
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CE is measured with more error than in the PSID.  The IV estimates of the income elasticities for food 
expenditures range from 0.31 to 0.40 across the various samples and specifications.  The IV estimates of 
the income elasticities for total nondurables and total expenditures are much higher.  These results are 
consistent with many empirical studies which find that food is a relative necessity compared to other 
consumption categories.
28 
  Table 5 is the central result of the paper, quantifying the self employed’s missing income. In this 
table, we uses the estimates of β and γ shown in Table 4 to construct estimates of (1-κs)—the estimated 
underreporting of income by the self employed relative to wage and salary workers.  We estimate this 
reporting gap as 
ˆ







and compute standard errors using standard asymptotic 
approximations.  In this table, we only show the results from the IV regressions, which are the appropriate 
way to estimate (8) given the measurement error in income.   
  The results of Table 5 are striking.  The estimated amount of underreporting is similar across the 
two surveys and are very similar regardless of the measures of income and expenditures used in the 
estimation.  For example, the estimated underreporting using total family income and food expenditures 
are 31.7 percent in the CE and 30.1 percent in the PSID.  Using labor plus business income and food 
expenditures yields estimates of 33.5 and 34.9 percent, respectively, in the CE and PSID.  The estimated 
underreporting is slightly smaller using broader measures of consumption.  For example, the estimated 
underreporting ranges from 25-28 percent using nondurable expenditures and total expenditures, across 
the various specifications.
  
  The results in this section, given the estimating assumptions, suggest that household surveys are 
like tax forms in that households with an incentive to misreport their income to the tax authorities also 
misreport their income to household surveys.  The results also suggest more broadly that household 
surveys are not immune to the potential problems of mis-measurement that plague other types of data.    
 
                                                            
28 See, for example, Aguiar and Hurst (2009).  
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6.  Examining the Validity of Key Identification Assumptions 
  
  In this section, we address the plausibility of our identifying assumptions, placing particular 
emphasis on underreporting as the first order source of differences in predicted expenditure.  First, our 
model imposes, conditional on our controls, a log linear Engel curve. Previous studies, Pissarides and 
Weber (1989) included, have found this to be a reasonable approximation. Besides analytic convenience, 
we fail to reject models incorporating higher order terms for all of our income and expenditure 
measures.
29  Second, we constrain the effect of controls and the income elasticity to be identical across 
groups. In all samples, as noted above, we fail to reject equality of the covariate coefficient vector. We do 
find some weak evidence that the income elasticity of the self employed is lower than wage and salary 
households, however it is inconsistent across samples and small in magnitude.
30  Three, we rely on a set 
of educational attainment dummies to instrument for permanent income. While the dummies are highly 
predictive of income, their exogeneity is certainly an open question.  Lacking a compelling alternative, 
and given the improvement in the estimated elasticities, we proceed under their assumed exogeneity.  
  Notwithstanding the preceding assumptions, underreporting remains the residual explanation for 
a difference in predicted expenditure across groups. It is useful to think about the separate Engel curves 
plotted in Figures 1—3. The measure of underreporting follows from converting the expenditure gap 
between the Engel curves into an income gap. The crucial identifying assumption of our model is 
attributing these expenditure gaps to income underreporting. However, there are other potential 
explanations for this expenditure gap even if income were accurately reported.  In the remainder of this 
                                                            
29 These specifications and all of the other robustness exercises are detailed in our online robustness appendix. 
30 We do this by estimating (8) and allowing   to vary across the two groups by additionally interacting ln y  with 
D .  This evidence is not robust across samples and alternative measures of income and expenditure. In both the 
PSID and CE, and using food expenditures and either measure of income, the data fail to reject equality of the 
income elasticities.  More importantly, even when the differences are statistically significant, the estimated 
differences in income elasticities are economically small.  We interpret this evidence as suggesting that, if anything, 
our underreporting results may be a lower bound on the actual level.  In each sample, whether significant or not, the 
income elasticity of the self employed is less than the workers. If this is true, then smaller values of β would imply 




section we address several alternative explanations and show that our estimates are robust to 
specifications that take the alternatives into account. 
6A.  Potential Systematic Differences in the Reporting of Expenditures 
  The fact that some business expenditures can substitute for personal expenditures may undermine 
the validity of the assumption of no differential mis-reporting of household expenditures between the two 
groups.  For example, the self employed sometimes purchase vehicles for their business.  In doing so, 
they may treat gasoline and maintenance associated with the vehicle as business expenses.  Yet, if the self 
employed also use that vehicle for personal use, it is possible that some of the expenses they attribute to 
the business actually should instead be recorded as household expenditures.  The story could also hold in 
reverse.  The self employed could conceivably report all outlays on vehicle expenses as being personal 
consumption even though some of the expenses are for their business.  Given this, the self employed 
could be underreporting or overreporting their personal expenditures to household surveys.   
  To test for the importance of this, we perform two separate exercises.  First, using the CE sample, 
we re-estimate the amount of underreporting of income using a variety of expenditure subcategories in 
order to explore the robustness of the results across the subcategories.  Then, we can verify whether 
expenditure subcategories that are likely not to be subject to the confounding of business and personal use 
yield different estimated underreporting gaps than categories where the potential substitution for business 
and personal use are larger.  For example, while vehicle expenditures may be easily attributed to the 
business even if they were for personal use, it is less likely that an individual would attribute the spending 
on home utilities as being a business expense.  To implement this procedure, we re-estimate (7) using the 
log of spending on different expenditure sub-categories as the dependent variable using the CE data.  
Focusing on utilities as a measure of expenditures yields an underreporting of income by the self 
employed of roughly 30 percent, nearly identical to the food expenditure, nondurable expenditure, and 
total expenditure results.   
  Across all the subcategories we explored, nearly all of them yielded an estimated underreporting 
gap in the 20 to 30 percent range.  One notable exception, however, is nondurable transportation  
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expenditures (which includes spending on vehicle gasoline, car maintenance, parking fees, tolls, etc.).  
Using this subcategory, we estimate underreporting of income by the self employed close to zero.  This is 
consistent with anecdotes that the self employed frequently classify a large amount of their vehicle 
expenditures associated with personal use as business expenses.  Overall, however, we find no evidence 
that the results across any of the other expenditure categories differ in any substantive way from our main 
results even though the substitutability with business expenditures differs markedly across the categories. 
  The results above, however, beg a different question.  Is it possible that the self employed 
underreport both income and expenditures by uniformly misreport their spending on all categories (aside 
from evidence on nondurable transportation expenditures)?  It is hard to tell a story that would generate 
this result.  However, it is possible for us to test this potential hypothesis directly.  To do so, we estimate 
the following relationship based on Deaton and Muellbauer's (1982) Almost Ideal Demand System such 
that:  
   
* log ' , jikt t j ikt ikt ikt CX             (9)   
where  jikt    is the share of expenditures allocated to category j , 
*
ikt C   represents the actual total 
expenditures of household i in period t and  ikt X  is our maintained vector of controls.  βj, in this case, 
represents how the share of spending on a given category changes as total expenditures increase.  βj less 
than 1 (and greater than zero) reflect categories that are relative necessities while βj greater than 1 reflect 
categories that are relative luxuries.  There is a large variation in estimated βj's across different 
consumption categories (see Banks et al (1997), Aguiar and Hurst (2009) and Aguiar and Bils (2010)). 
  We can modify (9) to allow for systematic misreporting of total expenditure by the self employed 
(by a constant fraction across all categories) such that: 
* exp ) (
C
ikt ikt i t kk CC     where C equals reported 
total expenditures, 
C
W   equals 1 for wage and salary workers (k = W), and 
C
S  different from 1 for the self 
employed (k = S).  Assuming the parameters of (9) are otherwise similar between the self employed and 
wage and salary workers we can identify  
C
S   from:  
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* log ' jikt t j ikt S ikt ikt CD X              (10) 
where  exp( / )
C
Sj    .  Underreporting all expenditures by a constant fraction  C   of course leaves 
the share  jikt   unchanged. The identification relies on the decreasing and increasing budget shares of 
various necessity and luxury good categories. This is similar to the idea underlying the procedure Aguiar 
and Bils (2010) uses to identify differential measurement error in expenditure reporting between the rich 
and poor using the CE data.  Using this procedure, and aggregating the results across a large number of 
consumption categories, we find no evidence that the self employed systematically underreport their 
expenditures relative to wage and salary workers.
31   
  The combined results of our two robustness exercises make us confident that any misreporting of 
expenditures is not biasing our results in any meaningful way. 
6B.  Potential Other Reasons That Could Cause Systematic Differences in the Income-
 Expenditure  Relationships. 
 
  In this subsection, we assess whether differences in the income-expenditure relationships between 
wage and salary workers and the self employed are driven by factors other than the systematic 
underreporting of income by the self employed.  In particular, we examine 1) differences in desired 
expenditures due to differences in hours worked, 2) differences in desired saving propensities between the 
two groups, and 3) differences in the potential conceptual measures of income between the two groups. 
 
Difference in Expenditures Due To Differences in Hours Worked 
  As documented in section 2, the self employed do systematically work more hours than wage and 
salary workers, even within the restricted sample of individuals is working full time.  Depending on the 
sample, these differences in work hours average between 10 and 15 percent.  Theory suggests that 
individuals who work more may engage in less home production compared to individuals who work less 
(Becker (1965) and Ghez and Becker (1975)), or that increased work hours may raise the marginal utility 
                                                            




32   Empirically, Aguiar and Hurst (2005, 2007, and 2009) show that a given consumption 
bundle produced with more market inputs, as opposed to time inputs, is indeed more expensive.  To the 
extent that the self employed engage in less home production, because they are allocating more hours to 
market work, expenditures may be higher simply because they are spending more for an equivalent 
consumption bundle. 
  To control for this potential difference in the market cost of the consumption bundle, we follow 
the procedure similar to that of Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994) and add log work hours as a 
control variable in our estimation of (8).  The results of including work hours directly into our regressions 
are shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6.  Column (1) of Table 6 re-estimates  (8) with the work hour 
controls using total family income as the income measure.  Column (2) re-estimates (8) with the work 
hour controls using labor plus business income as the income measure.  As seen from the results in 
columns (1) and (2), controlling for work hours does not change our conclusions in any way significant.   
 
Differences in Saving Propensities 
 
  A potentially more significant problem is the extent to which the self employed have different 
saving preferences relative to wage and salary workers.  If the self employed face more income risk, they 
may want to accumulate more wealth to insure themselves against potential shocks.  Likewise, if the self 
employed face more binding liquidity constraints, they may accumulate more wealth to overcome such 
constraints.  Finally, if the self employed receive fewer fringe benefits, they may have to save more for 
health shocks and for retirement.  All of these factors will shift the income-expenditure relationship 
downward (as a result of the higher saving propensities), causing us to under-estimate the extent to which 
the self employed underreport their income.    
  However, the self employed may also have a higher tolerence for risk (Barsky et al., 1997).  As a 
result, for a given amount of risk, the self employed may have a lower desire to accumulate precautionary 
                                                            
32  Aguiar and Hurst (2009) show that non separable preferences between consumption and leisure are isomorphic to 
separable preferences between consumption and leisure with a home production sector that combines expenditures 
and time to produce the consumption good.   
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savings.  The differences in risk preferences could result in less desired saving by the self employed and, 
as a result, cause us to overstate the extent to which the self employed underreport their income.  A 
similar result would occur if the self employed systematically expected higher income in the future. 
  We can assess whether such possibilities affect the expenditure gap by segmenting the sample by 
age.  In particular, high expected future income, binding liquidity constraints, and the existence of labor 
income risk are much more important for young households relative to older households (Gourinchas and 
Parker, 2000).  In columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 we re-estimate (8) on a sample of young and older 
households, respectively.  We define younger households as households between the ages of 25 and 40 
and define older households as households between the ages of 40 and 55.  As seen from the table, the 
results with respect to the estimated amount of underreporting are very similar between old and young 
households.  These results suggest that differences in future income expectations, differences in binding 
liquidity constraints, and differences in precautionary motives are likely not the primary driver of our 
results.
33 
  As an additional robustness exercise, we examined the extent of underreporting by the level of 
household wealth.   To do this, we augmented (8) to include dummies for whether the household was in 
the second wealth quartile, the third wealth quartile or the top wealth quartile along with our 
entrepreneurship dummy interacted separately with all of the wealth quartiles. The goals of this 
specification are twofold.  First, we ask the general question as to whether differences in household 
wealth (which could result from past savings behavior) could explain the estimated underreporting by the 
self employed.  Second, the specification allows us to assess whether the extent to which households 
underreport differs by wealth quartiles.  The specification, available in the robustness appendix, shows 
that controlling for initial wealth does not undo the estimates of the underreporting nor do the estimates 




33 Our results are not sensitive to the age cutoff.  Even looking at 45-55 year olds or 50-55 year olds, we see little 
change in our estimates of the amount of underreporting.  
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Different Conceptual Measures of Income 
 
  Finally, we assess whether the above underreporting results could be driven by differences in the 
conceptual measures of income between the two types of individuals.  We usually define income (net of 
taxes and transfers) as the economic resources that can be allocated to either consumption or savings.  For 
wage and salary workers, the distinction is usually straight forward.  Any dollar earned is given to the 
household and then the household decides how much to allocate to consumption and savings.
34  For the 
self employed, however, this distinction may be more complex.  The self employed usually make a 
decision of how much of the return of the business to reinvest in the business (in the form of retained 
earnings) jointly with the decision of how much money they should withdrawal from the business in the 
form of self employed business income.  The true income measure of the self employed should be any 
resources that they remove from their business to fund consumption and other types of saving as well as 
any retained earnings.  Unfortunately in the CE and PSID we cannot observe any retained earnings.
35  To 
the extent that some of the desired saving of the self employed is done via retained earnings, the self 
employed could have a higher propensity to consume out of the income they draw out of the business.  
This could explain the differential income-expenditure patterns documented above. 
  To test for the importance of the conceptual difference in income as an explanation of our results, 
we examine the underreporting behavior of the self employed with zero reported business wealth relative 
to the underreporting behavior of the self employed with non-zero business wealth.  The assumption is 
that if the self employed are reinvesting a substantial amount of their income into the business, it should 
show up in the value of their business.  Such an identification is made possible given the fact that a 
substantial fraction of the self employed do not own business or own business with little  value (see Hurst 
and Lusardi 2004).  This is consistent with the facts documented in Hurst and Pugsley (2010) showing 
                                                            
34  Fringe benefits such as pension contributions are an exception. 
35  Some household surveys, such as the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), include repeated 
observations on business capital that can be used to estimate  retained earnings. Hamilton (2000), which measures 
self employed earnings from the SIPP, includes both the draw and an adjustment to account for retained earnings in 
the income measure. The SIPP however, does not include any information on expenditures.   
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that many of the self employed are in industries where very little physical capital is needed (skilled 
craftsmen, real estate agents, lawyers, etc.). 
  To test for the importance of potentially omitting retained earnings from our income measure, we 
re-estimate (8) including  separate dummies for whether the business owner has business wealth equal to 
zero and whether the business owner has wealth above $10,000.  We can only do this for the PSID 
specification because the CE does not have a measure of business wealth.  The PSID data includes 
measures of business wealth (and all wealth components) in survey years 1984, 1989, and 1994.  As a 
result, we restrict our analysis to only the data from 1984 and 1994 given that the 1989 survey does not 
collect information on food expenditures.  During these time periods, roughly one-third of the self 
employed had zero reported business wealth and fifty percent had business wealth more than $10,000.  
The remaining had business wealth between $0 and $10,000.  Although we estimate statistically 
significant difference in the estimated gaps between the two groups of self employed, the sizes of the gaps 
are limited (36 percent for the high business wealth group vs.  26 percent for the zero business wealth 
group).  Furthermore, the estimated underreporting gap is still substantial for those self employed with 
zero business wealth.  These finding suggest that the differences in the conceptual measures of income 
between the self employed and the wage and salary workers is not the primary driver of the 
underreporting of income we documented above. 
 
7.  Differences in Underreporting Across Different Groups and Tax Regimes 
 
  To bolster our case that households underreport their income to household surveys in a way 
similar to how they underreport their income to tax authorities, we explore whether factors that predict 
underreporting in the tax data are also found to predict underreporting within the household surveys.  In 
particular, the literature exploring underreporting of income by the self employed to  tax authorities has 
found that underreporting is higher when marginal tax rates are higher (Clotfelter, 1983) and that there is 
some variation in the extent of underreporting across the self employed in different industries.  For 
example, Andreoni et al. (1998) finds that  the self employed in professional industries underreport their  
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income the least while those who are shopkeepers and restaurateurs underestimate their income the most.  
We find suggestive evidence of similar patterns within the household surveys. 
  To get a better sense of the changing nature of the underreporting over time, we look at the 
estimated underreporting separately for each year.  To do this, we re-estimate (8) but instead of putting in 
the self employment dummy alone we include the self employment dummy interacted with individual 
year dummies.  In Figure 4, we show the results using non durable expenditure as our measure of 
expenditure and using total family income as our measure of income.  As seen from the figure, 
underreporting was high during the early 1980s (prior to 1986), fell between the late 1980s and mid 1990s 
and then started increasing during the late 1990s and early 2000.   
  Does the year-to-year variation in the extent to which the self employed underreport their income 
correlate with prevailing tax regime within the U.S.?  To explore this, we start by correlating the 
estimated coefficients of year dummies with measures of the aggregate tax regime.  For our tax measure, 
we use the annual average marginal tax rate within the U.S. (inclusive of federal and state taxes) made 
available by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
36  For reference, we plot this series in Appendix 
Figure A1.  It is well known that the average marginal tax rate was high during the early 1980s, fell by 
roughly 15 percent (roughly 5 percentage points) through the mid 1980s due to the 1981 and 1986 tax 
reductions, increased gradually during the 1990s, and then fell again with the tax reductions in the early 
2000s.  A simple correlation of the estimated underreporting by the self employed by year (as shown in 
Figure 4) with the average marginal tax rates within the U.S. (as shown in Figure A1) yields a correlation 
coefficient of 0.37 which is statistically significant.  Most of this is driven by the high amount of 
underreporting prior to 1986, the sharp decline in underreporting between 1986 and the early 1990s, and 
the relative stability of the underreporting rate throughout most of the 1990s (aside from 1993 and 1994). 
  In Table 7, we explore this relationship more extensively.  In this table, we show how 
underreporting is related to the average marginal tax rate within the U.S. along with various other 
                                                            
36 See http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/ally/.  The series was computed by Daniel Feenberg and is based on micro data 
file provide by the Statistics of Income Division of the IRS.  
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demographic controls.  As above, we do this using nondurable expenditure from the CE (column 1), food 
expenditure from the CE (column 2), and food expenditure from the PSID (column 3).  All specifications 
use log total family income as the income measure.  To estimate these coefficients, we follow the same 
procedure discussed above for estimating the year dummies.  In particular, we estimate (8) but add 
interactions between the self employment dummy and the relevant demographic variables.  We then use 
the estimated coefficients on the interactions to compute the gap of underreporting, 1   .  Again, 
asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
  As seen from Table 7, very few variables enter significantly.  Moreover, the standard errors are 
large in all the specifications, making it hard to rule out either large negative or large positive effects with 
most of the control variables.  A few patterns, however, do emerge.  First, even conditional on control 
variables, the average marginal tax rate is still a significant predictor of the extent of underreporting.  
Most of this identification comes from the fact that underreporting was much higher in pre-1986 when 
average marginal tax rates were higher.  After 1986, the variation between the average marginal tax rate 
and the extent of income underreporting by the self employed was essentially zero.  Given the power 
issues, the results are only suggestive.  But, the results do show that underreporting was markedly higher 
prior to 1986 when average marginal tax rates were higher.  This evidence is broadly consistent with the 
results using actual tax return data. 
  The only additional significant result that emerges from Table 7 is that those with advanced 
educational degrees are less likely to underreport their income.  We do not have enough power to look at 
individual industries in isolation.  However, most of the self employed individuals with advanced degrees 
are professionals such as doctors, dentists, lawyers, and accountants.  In all of these professions, the self 
employed may find it more difficult to hide their income given that there is usually a detailed paper trail 
on the other side of the transaction.  This is particularly true for doctors, dentists, and other medical 
professions given that they often bill insurance companies for their services rendered. The point estimates 
from columns 1 and 3 suggest that those with professional degrees only underreport their income by 12 
percent and 23 percent, respectively, which represents a significant reduction relative to households with  
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a high school degree or less.  Again, the evidence is broadly consistent with the literature using tax filings 
that find professionals are less likely to underreport their income.  
 
8.  The Importance of Income Underreporting By the Self Employed 
 
  In this section, we show how not accounting for the systematic underreporting of income by the 
self employed can lead to biased conclusions in a variety of settings.  To do so, we re-examine several 
empirical examples where variation from the self employed plays a prominent role.  For the most part, we 
restrict the scope to results that can be explored using our existing PSID and CE samples.  But, for some 
analyses, we must slightly change the sample criteria.
37  Below, we only give a brief overview of the 
procedures.  Collectively, the results in this section underscore our central point that taking a household 
survey at face value without thinking about the incentives the households have to report correctly could 
undermine a wide range of empirical analyses.   
 
8A.  Differences in Earnings between the Self Employed and Wage and Salary Workers 
 
  The most straightforward implication of our findings pertains to papers that estimate earnings 
differentials between wage and salary workers and the self employed. In a recent example,  Hamilton 
(2000) estimates the returns to job tenure and experience in both self employment and wage employment. 
Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),  he carefully constructs lifecycle 
wage profiles separately for wage and salary workers and for the self employed under several alternative 
measures of self employed income.
38  He finds the median self employed individual’s wages, cumulating 
over 10 years, are 35 percent lower than a comparable wage and salary worker.  He assigns a prominent 
role to non pecuniary returns to self employment over alternative explanations.
39   
                                                            
37 A full discussion, including details on specifications and sample restrictions can be found in the online robustness 
that accompanies this paper.   
38 His favored measure adjusts the draw from the business to account for retained earnings. 
39 Using the panel dimension of the SIPP Hamilton (2000)  also supplies convincing evidence that the gap cannot be 




  Throughout his analysis, Hamilton did not adjust his estimates for the fact that the earnings data 
of the self employed could be substantially underreported.  In this subsection, we do not attempt to 
replicate formally the analysis of Hamilton using the SIPP data.  The reason for this is that it is obvious 
that not accounting for the underreporting of income by the self employed will severely bias these results.  
As we show above, the self employed earnings are underreported by roughly 25 to 30 percent.  This 
difference is only mitigated slightly once we control for differences in work hours between the two 
groups.  As a result, it is likely that a substantial amount of the earnings gap estimated by Hamilton is 
simply due to the measurement error in household surveys with respect to self employment income.
 40 
 
8B.  Difference in Wealth Holdings Between the Self Employed and Wage and Salary Workers 
  There is a separate literature that focuses on differences in wealth between the self employed and 
wage and salary workers.  Most of this work looks to examine the importance of financial frictions facing 
the self employed.  The argument goes that because the self employed face binding liquidity constraints 
they must accumulate additional wealth to self finance their entrepreneurial projects.  For example, both 
Gentry and Hubbard (2004) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) document that the self employed hold a 
disproportionate amount of the aggregate wealth within the U.S..  Gentry and Hubbard (2004) goes 
further and shows that even conditional on income, the self employed hold higher wealth than wage and 
salary workers.  Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) uses such relationships to calibrate a model of financial 
constraints facing business owners to explain the skewed wealth distribution within the U.S.. 
  The differential relationship between wealth conditional on income between the self employed 
and wage and salary workers depends on the extent to which the self employed income is reported 
without error.  To the extent that the self employed underreport their income, the conditional wealth 
holdings of the self employed relative to wage and salary workers will be overstated. 
                                                            
40 We want to stress that we are not saying that non pecuniary benefits are not important for the self employed.  
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) do account for the fact that the self employed do underreport their income. 
Even with this adjustment, they still conclude that non pecuniary benefits of self employment could be very large.  
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  To illustrate this point, we use data from the 1984, 1989, and 1994 PSID.  Our sample is 
otherwise the same as we used above.  Using this data, we regress log total wealth (inclusive of home 
equity) on a self employment dummy, current household income, and the demographic variables included 
above when estimating equations (1) and (2).  With this specification, we exclude those households with 
zero or negative wealth.  Similar to the results documented by others in the literature, we find that the net 
worth of the self employed is 93 log points higher than wage and salary workers (a coefficient on the self 
employment dummy of 0.93 with a standard error of 0.05).  If, however, we adjust for the potential 
misreporting of income by the self employed, the estimated wealth differences fall dramatically.  To do 
this, we simply add 30 percent to the current income reports of the self employed and then re-estimate the 
above wealth equation.  Modifying the income of the self employed reduced the estimated wealth gap to 
63 log points (standard error = 5 log points).  As a result, roughly one third of the estimated wealth 
differences between the self employed is simply due to the underreporting of income by the self 
employed.  The results are nearly identical if we estimate the regression in levels and include households 
with non-positive wealth. 
 
8C.  The Empirical Importance of Precautionary Savings 
  The first two examples show how accounting for the underreporting of income by the self 
employed could lead to substantial changes in the results that directly compare the economic behavior of 
the self employed to that of wage and salary workers.  In the next several examples, we show that the 
underreporting of income by the self employed can bias a variety of other types of analyses.    
  We start by focusing on the importance of precautionary savings.  Carroll and Samwick (1998) 
uses data from the PSID during the 1980s to explore the relationship between wealth holdings and income 
risk conditional on the level of income and other demographics.  They measure income risk as the 
variance of actual household income as well as decompose the variance of household income into its 
permanent and transitory components.  They instrument income risk using industry dummies.  They  
34 
 
conclude that up to 50 percent of household wealth accumulation for households under the age of 50 is 
due to precautionary motives.   
  Defining a sample that is analogous to Carroll and Samwick and using their same specification, 
we find that 47.5 percent of household saving can be attributed to precautionary motives.  This estimate is 
nearly identical to the results reported in their work.
41    However, if we increase the income of the self 
employed by 30 percent to adjust for the underreporting, the estimated importance of precautionary 
savings is 13.5 percent lower (from 47.5 percent to 41.1 percent).  What drives this decline?  Industries in 
which the self employed are more prevalent are also the industries which are found to have more income 
risk.  When regressing wealth on income risk controlling for household income, it appears that 
households in industries where there is more income risk are holding more wealth for a given amount of 
income.  However, some of this relationship is simply due to the fact that we are mismeasuring the level 
of income for those households.  Our results show that ignoring the income underreporting of the self 
employed can introduce substantial upward biases in the importance of precautionary savings in 
explaining total wealth accumulation of younger households. 
 
8D.  Adjustments to Life Cycle Earnings Profiles 
 
  Self employment probabilities change over the lifecycle.  For example, within our PSID, CE and 
CPS sample, the fraction of individuals that are self employed rises from 5.0 percent, 5.9 percent and 5.1 
percent respectively when households are 25 to 19.1 percent, 11.2 percent and 16.5 percent respectively 
when households are 45.  They rise further to 39.5 percent, 21.6 percent and 28.3 percent when 
households are 65.
42  Given that the self employment propensities are changing over the lifecycle, the 
extent to which individual earnings is measured with error is changing over the lifecycle. 
                                                            
41 The details of the specification and sample can be found in the online robustness appendix. 
42 We extend our sample to include households up to the age of 65 as long as they meet our other sample criteria. 
The number of households whose head’s age is close to 65 is small in both the PSID (n=2,597) and the CE sample 
(n=120). However our estimates are broadly consistent with the more precisely estimated versions from the CPS 
where the number of households at age 65 is large (n=2,831).   
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  How much of the decline in average earnings between the ages of 45 and 65 could be driven by 
the underreporting of income by the self employed?  Within the PSID, CE and CPS samples, respectively, 
average earnings fell by 27.3 percent, 21.5 percent and 14.3 percent between the ages of 45 and 65.
43  
Simply adjusting for underreporting reduces these declines by 1.4, 3.2, and 3.6 percentage points.  Taken 
together, between 5 and 10 percent of the decline in lifecycle earnings between the ages of 45 and 65 in 
the PSID and the CE can be accounted for by the underreporting of income by the self employed.   
 
8E.  Spatial Differences in Average Earnings 
 
  Finally, we show that the underreporting of income by the self employed could bias conclusions 
about the spatial differences in earnings.  As shown by Glaeser (2007), self employment propensities 
differ markedly across U.S. cities.  Given this, comparing earnings across space will yield biased results if 
one does not account for differences in self employment propensities across space.  
  Using the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) from the 2000 Census, we illustrate this point.   
We construct a sample of male heads between the ages of 25 and 64, who are currently working, usually 
work more than 30 hours per week, and worked 40 weeks during the previous year.  We further restrict 
this sample to only include individuals who live in a defined MSA.  Within this sample, we find a 
tremendous amount of variation in self employment rates across MSAs.  Across the MSAs, the mean and 
median self employment rates were 12.5 percent and 11.9 percent, respectively.  The standard deviation 
in self employment rates across the MSAs was 2.9 percent.    
  To illustrate the potential for the underreporting of income by the self employed to yield biased 
results when computing earnings differentials across place, we look at a few pair wise comparisons.  To 
do this, we examine conditional earnings differentials.  Specifically, we regress log earnings on one year 
age dummies and a series of education, usual hours worked per week, and weeks worked per year 
                                                            
43 A more formal analysis of this question would want to adjust for either individual or cohort fixed effects.  This 
example is only meant to be illustrative.  
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dummies.  We then compare these residuals, with and without adjusting for the underreporting of income 
by the self employed, across MSAs.   
  Not accounting for the underreporting of income and conditional on the demographic and work 
hour adjustments, individuals in our sample from Nassau County New York earned 8.9 percent more than 
individuals in our sample from Detroit.  16.8 percent of the individuals from Nassau County were self 
employed while only 10.2 percent of the individuals from Detroit were self employed.  Adjusting upward 
the income of all self employed individuals, conditional on observables, by 30 percent, increases the 
Nassau-Detroit earnings differential by nearly 20 percent (from 8.9 percent to 10.6 percent).  A similar 
comparison can be made between San Francisco (where 16.2 percent of individuals are self employed) 
and Buffalo (where 10.2 percent of individuals are self employed).  Adjusting for the underreporting of 
income of the self employed increases the San-Francisco-Buffalo earnings gap by 6.7 percent (from 23.9 
percent to 25.5 percent).  The earnings differential between the Barnstable-Yarmouth, Massachusetts 
MSA (which has the highest self employment rate among MSAs at 25.5 percent) and the Kokomo, 
Indiana MSA (which has the lowest self employment rate among MSAs at 6.0 percent) gets reduced by 
35 percent when adjusting for the underreporting of income by the self employed (from -14.7 percent to -
9.6 percent).   
 
8F.  Potential Other Applications  
 
  The above results show that not accounting for the underreporting of income of the self employed 
can lead to quantitatively important biases when comparing the income and savings behavior of the self 
employed with wage and salary workers, when computing the economic importance of precautionary 
savings, when estimating lifecycle earnings profiles, and when computing earnings differentials across 
space.  There are many other situations where not adjusting for the underreporting of income by the self 
employed can potentially lead to quantitatively important biases.  For example, given that self 
employment propensities differ across races and genders, failing to account for the underreporting of 
income could lead to biased estimates of racial and gender earnings gaps.  Likewise, there is much  
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interest in comparing the borrowing and default behavior of the self employed to wage and salary 
workers.  Not properly measuring income for the self employed could lead to biased results in this setting 




Essentially all empirical work using data from household surveys assumes that household income 
is not systematically mismeasured.  However, there is reason to believe that this assumption may not 
hold, particularly for the self employed.  Research from tax audits finds that the self employed 
substantially underreport their income to tax authorities.  What was less known to the research community 
is the extent to which the self employed also underreport their income within U.S. surveys. Our paper 
contributes to the literature by filling this gap. 
Using data from both the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, we find that self employed underreport their income by about 30 percent within household 
surveys relative to wage and salary workers. The results are remarkably consistent across both surveys.  
As robustness analyses, we implement a sequence of alternative specifications that relax various elements 
of our assumptions.  Our results are essentially unchanged throughout.  Consistent with data from the tax 
audits, we also find that the amount of underreporting was higher when marginal tax rates were higher 
and was lower among those with an advanced degree.   
The results in this paper have implications for many literatures that use the income data reported 
in U.S. household surveys.  In particular, we show that research that compares the earnings or saving 
behavior between the self employed and wage and salary workers will yield substantially biased results if 
the research does not account for the underreporting of income by the self employed.  Moreover, we show 
that in many other settings, failing to account for the underreporting of income by the self employed can 
lead to quantitatively biased conclusions.  In particular, we show this to be true with respect to studies of 
the importance of precautionary savings, lifecycle earnings profiles, and differences in earnings across 
MSAs.    
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The results in this paper also point to a potentially bigger concern.  There is an active literature 
showing that individuals will respond to incentives when reporting information to administrative sources 
(like tax authorities) or alter their behavior when participating in experiments.  Yet, researchers often 
ignore the potential of such problems spilling over into the household surveys that we use for much of our 
economic analysis.  It is naive to assume that individuals who are willing to misconstrue their behavior to 
administrative sources would automatically provide accurate responses when participating in household 
surveys.  While it is likely true that the benefits of providing distorted information to household surveys 
are small, it is also likely true that the benefits of providing accurate information are also small.  To the 
extent that individuals would have to exert effort to provide an accurate response to household surveys or 
feel compelled to maintain consistency in light of concerns about confidentiality, economic theory would 
suggest that they would continue to provide the erroneous information, even if there is no direct benefit of 
doing so.  We show these effects are present with respect to the income reporting of the self employed.  
Future work should try to identify and explore other situations in which individuals may provide 
systematically biased information to household surveys. 
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The CE is conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The primary objective of the survey is to 
collect detailed household expenditure information to update the weights used to construct the Consumer 
Price Index.  However, the household level data of the CE have also been used extensively in academic 
research to explore household consumption behavior.  The CE is a quarterly survey and its modern 
version started in 1980.  In addition to detailed information on household expenditures, the CE collects 
key information on household demographics, income, and employment status. The CE interviews a 
consumer unit up to five times, once every 3 months. The first interview is conducted to establish contact 
with, and collect such data on, the interviewees; the subsequent four interviews are carried out to collect 
most of the expenditure data. In the fifth interview, demographic, income, and labor supply variables are 
updated.  After the fifth interview, the consumer unit leaves the sample and new units are added to the 
sample, giving the CE a rotating sample structure.    
PSID Data 
  The PSID is a longitudinal survey conducted by the Institute of Social Research at the University 
of Michigan.  The PSID collects extensive information on employment history, demographic 




To match the PSID and CE sample selection criteria, we restrict our analysis to households with a 
civilian male household head, whose age is between 25 and 55 (inclusive), who worked at least 40 weeks 
during the last calendar year and usually worked at least 30 hours per week in paid or self employment.  
We further restrict the sample by excluding households with a male wage and salary worker, but whose 
spouse (if present) was self employed.  Lastly, we exclude any remaining households who had non- 
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positive labor plus business family income or who had any farm income.  We define two measures of 
household income within the CPS:  family labor earnings plus family business income and total family 
income.  The two income measures are defined analogously to the way they were defined in the CE and 
the PSID.  Finally, self employed households are defined as those households whose male head reports 
that for his longest job during the last year he was self employed.
44  Over the sample period of 1980 to 
2003 applying these restrictions yields a sample of 511,306 households, with 70,423 of those classified as 
self employed.   
                                                            
44 To determine the class of employment, the CPS interviewer asks a series of questions about the individual’s 
employer to determine whether he worked for a private firm, for a government (federal, state, or local), worked 
without pay in family business, or were self employed (incorporated or unincorporated).   Since we have already 
excluded those individuals working without pay, wage and salary workers are defined as those working for a private 
firm or for a government.  
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Self Employed and Wage and Salary Worker Samples, CE, PSID, and CPS 
 
  Data Set 















        
Panel A:  Income Measures 
Total  Family  Income  10.87 10.86 11.20 11.00 10.97 10.93 
Labor  Plus  Business  Income  10.81 10.84 11.02 10.91 10.87 10.88 
Panel B:  Expenditure Measures 
Food  Expenditure  8.85 8.67 8.97 8.73  -  - 
Nondurable  Expenditure  9.98  9.78  - - - - 
Total  Expenditure  10.74  10.51  - - - - 
Panel C:  Other Labor Supply and Demographic Measures 
Average Age of Head  41.4  39.0  40.7  37.9  41.7  39.2 
% Education = 12   26.9  29.2  20.5  24.0  29.7  33.8 
% Education = Some College  23.2  23.3  31.2  31.2  22.7  23.8 
% Education = College  20.3  18.9  21.4  19.2  20.1  18.7 
% Education = Graduate School  17.9  12.5  14.9  9.9  17.8  11.6 
%  Black  3.4 7.8 2.7 9.7 3.2 8.9 
%  Married  83.2 80.6 86.7 78.6 86.1 81.8 
Average Family Size  3.4  3.26  3.30  3.10  3.36  3.22 
Average Head Work Hours  2,561  2,317  2,560  2,293  2526  2280 
        
Sample  Size  2,508 24,704 4,207 29,639  70,423  440,883 
        
Notes:  This table compares income, expenditure, and demographic variables between the self employed and wage and salary workers within the CE, PSID, and 
CPS.  Each sample is restricted to include all households with male heads between the ages of 25 and 55 (inclusive) who are working full time.  Additional 
sample restrictions for each survey are discussed in the text.    
46 
 
Table 2:  Conditional Log Income Differences for Full Time Wage and Salary Workers and Self Employed 
 
 Data  Sets/Specification 
  I. Income = Total  
Family Income 
II. Income = Labor Earnings +  
Business Income 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Dummy:  Self Employed  -0.08 0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.01 -0.11 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Demographic Controls Included  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Included  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Sample CE  PSID  CPS  CE  PSID  CPS 
        
Notes:  The table shows the regression of household income on a self employment dummy and additional demographic and year controls.  In panel I, our 
measure of income is total family income for the household.  In panel II, our measure of income is labor earnings of the household plus household business 
income.  We run the regressions separately within each of the three surveys.  For example, columns (1) - (3) show the results from the same regression, but using 
data from the CE, PSID, and CPS surveys, respectively.  All regressions control for:  a series of five year age dummies, four dummies indicating the education of 
the household head (exactly high school, some college, exactly college, and more than college; less than high school was omitted), a dummy if the household 
head was Black, a dummy if the household head was married, and a series of family size dummies.  The CE, PSID, and CSP samples are the same as the ones 
defined in Table 1.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
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Table 3:  Conditional Log Expenditure Differences For Full Time Wage and Salary Workers and Self Employed 
 
  Data Sets/Dependent Variable 











      
Dummy:  Self Employed  0.12 0.13 0.16 0.14 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Demographic Controls Included  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
      
Notes:  The table shows the regression of household expenditure on a self employment dummy and additional demographic and year controls.  In panel I, we 
show the estimates using CE data.  In panel II, we show the estimates using PSID data.  For the CE sample, we explore conditional differences between the self 
employed and the wage and salary workers using three measures of expenditures: food (column 1), nondurable expenditures (column 2), and total expenditures 
(column 3).  The PSID sample has information only on food expenditures.  All regressions control for:  a series of five year age dummies, four dummies 
indicating the education of the household head (exactly high school, some college, exactly college, and more than college; less than high school was omitted), a 
dummy if the household head was black, a dummy if the household head was married, and a series of family size dummies.  The CE and PSID samples are the 
same as the ones defined in Table 1.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
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Table 4:  Log Expenditure Differences Between Self Employed and Wage Workers,  
Conditional on Log Income and Demographics 
  I.  Income = Total  
Family Income 
II. Income = Labor Earnings 
Plus Business Income 
Sample/Expenditure  Measure OLS IV OLS IV 
      
Panel A:  Estimates of β 
        
CEX, Nondurable Expenditure  0.37  0.60  0.34  0.61 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
CEX, Total Expenditure  0.42  0.76  0.39  0.76 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
CEX,  Food  Expenditure  0.26 0.40 0.25 0.40 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
PSID,  Food  Expenditure  0.30 0.32 0.29 0.31 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Panel B:  Estimates of γ 
      
CEX, Nondurable Expenditure  0.17  0.18  0.18  0.19 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
CEX, Total Expenditure  0.20  0.21  0.21  0.23 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
        
CEX,  Food  Expenditure  0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
PSID,  Food  Expenditure  0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Notes:  This table shows the OLS and IV estimates of equation (8) from the text.  Equation (8) estimates the 
relationship between log household expenditures and log household income conditional on a self employment 
dummy and other demographics.  The coefficient on log household income is denoted as β and the coefficient on the 
self employment dummy is denoted γ.  The demographic controls are the same as the controls used to estimate the 
results in Tables 2 and 3, aside from the education dummies.  We use the education dummies as the instruments for 
income in the IV specifications.  As with the results in Tables 2 and 3, we estimate the regression using different 
measures of expenditures and for different samples (indicated down the rows) and for different measures of 
household income (indicated across the columns).  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The samples 
are the same as the ones discussed in Table 1.   
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Table 5:  Predicted Fraction of Income Underreported by Self Employed,  
Baseline Specification 
 




Income =  
Total Family  
Income 
Income =  
Labor Earnings Plus 
Business Income 
    
CEX, Nondurable Expenditure  25.5  27.5 
 (1.5)  (1.6) 
    
CEX, Total Expenditure  24.5  26.5 
 (1.5)  (1.5) 
    
CEX, Food Expenditure  31.7  33.5 
 (2.0)  (2.0) 
    
PSID, Food Expenditure  30.1  34.9 
 (2.2)  (1.9) 
    
Notes:  This table shows the estimates of the amount of underreporting of income by the self employed, denoted by 
(1 - κ), using the estimates of β and γ from Table 4.  We show the different estimates of (1-κ) using different 
measures of expenditure, using data from the different surveys, and using different measures of income.  In this table, 
we only show the estimates using the β and γ estimates from the IV specifications.  Asymptotic standard errors are 
computed for the transformation 1-κ using a robust estimate of the variance covariance matrix.  
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Table 6:  Predicted Fraction of Income Underreported by Self Employed, Alternate Specifications 
 Specification/Sample 
Expenditure  Measure  1 2 3 4 
      
CEX,  Nondurable  Expenditure  25.2 27.4 26.6 24.4 
  (1.5) (1.6) (2.7) (1.8) 
      
CEX,  Total  Expenditure 24.5 26.7 24.2 24.6 
  (1.5) (1.5) (2.6) (1.7) 
      
CEX,  Food  Expenditure 31.5 33.5 35.7 28.6 
  (2.0) (1.9) (3.7) (2.2) 
      
PSID,  Food  Expenditure 28.6 34.1 30.1 28.4 
  (2.2) (1.8) (3.0) (3.0) 
      
Income Measure  Total   Labor Plus Business  Total   Total  
      
Specification Include  Log  Work 
Hours as a Control 
Include Log Work 
Hours as a Control 
Restrict To Heads 
With Age 25-40 
Restrict To Heads 
With Age 40-55 
      
Notes:  This table shows the amount of underreporting of income by the self employed (1-κ) for alternate specifications of equation (8) from the text.  All 
specifications in this table are based on the IV specification using CEX data with total nondurable expenditures as the expenditure measure.  As a result, these 
estimates should be compared to row (1) of Table 5.  In columns (1) and (2), we add log work hours to our vector or control variables.  The first column uses 
total family income as the income measure while the second column uses labor plus business income as the income measure.  In columns (3) and (4), we split the 
samples by age (young vs. old).  In columns (5) and (6), we only use data from the 1984, 1989, and 1994 PSID because they are the only years that collect 
information on household business wealth.  In column (5), we only include the self employed with zero business wealth.  In column (6), we only include the s elf 
employed with more than $10,000 in business wealth.  For all specifications, the sample is otherwise the same as the one described in the note to Table 1. 
Asymptotic standard errors are computed for the transformation 1-κ using a robust estimate of the variance covariance matrix.  
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Table 7:  Explaining the Income Gap Among the Self Employed, Percentage Changes to (1- ) 









     
Average marginal federal tax rate (percent)  2.24  2.76  1.56 
  (0.89) (1.18) (0.84) 
     
 Age:  40-55  1.91  0.62  3.45 
  (3.86) (5.32) (4.63) 
     
Ed = Some College  4.94  6.04  14.51 
  (5.15) (6.72) (4.74) 
Ed = College  -5.62  -3.03  2.20 
  (5.08) (6.81) (6.16) 
Ed = More than College  -11.48  -2.89  -23.03 
  (6.00) (7.47) (9.74) 
     
Black 10.39  2.98  6.03 
  (16.30) (18.43) (11.25) 
Married  -8.19 -21.05 -4.11 
  (5.47) (8.63) (9.39) 
     
Income Measure  Total Family  Total Family  Total Family 
     
Note:  This table shows how the estimates of (1-κ) change with economic and demographic variables.  To get these estimates, we re-estimate equation (8) with 
the relevant variable of interest interacted with a self employment dummy.  To get this specification, we also included the average marginal federal tax rate as a 
separate control.  The results in this table are based on the IV specification using the relevant specifications.  All specifications use total family income as the 
income measure.  Panel I shows the results using CE data while panel II shows the results using PSID data.  The samples are the same as the ones used in Table 
1.  Asymptotic standard errors are computed for the transformation 1-κ using a robust estimate of the variance covariance matrix.  
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Figure 1:  Relationship Between Total Family Money and Nondurable Expenditure, CE 
 
Panel A:  OLS Estimation 
 
Notes:  This figure shows the OLS estimates of the Engel curves as specified in equation (3) in the text, separately for 
wage/salary workers (solid line) and the self employed (dashed line).  We evaluate both curves at the sample means of the 
demographic control for the pooled sample.  The estimated intercepts for the self employed and the wage/salary workers, 
respectively, are 7.02 and 5.55.  The estimated slopes for each group, respectively, are 0.27 and 0.39.  The sample for each 
specification are the same as the ones described in the notes to Table 1.  
 
Panel B:  IV Estimation 
 
Notes:  This figure shows the OLS estimates of the Engel curves as specified in equation (3) in the text, separately for 
wage/salary workers (solid line) and the self employed (dashed line).  We evaluate both curves at the sample means of the 
demographic control for the pooled sample.  The estimated intercepts for the self employed and the wage/salary workers, 
respectively, are 4.37 and 3.12.  The estimated slopes for each group, respectively, are 0.51 and 0.61.  The sample for each 




















Figure 2:  Relationship Between Total Family Money and Food Expenditure, CE 
 
Panel A:  OLS Estimation 
 
Notes:  This figure shows the OLS estimates of the Engel curves as specified in equation (3) in the text, separately for 
wage/salary workers (solid line) and the self employed (dashed line).  We evaluate both curves at the sample means of the 
demographic control for the pooled sample.  The estimated intercepts for the self employed and the wage/salary workers, 
respectively, are 6.54 and 5.68.  The estimated slopes for each group, respectively, are 0.21 and 0.28.  The sample for each 
specification are the same as the ones described in the notes to Table 1.  
 
Panel B:  IV Estimation
 
Notes:  This figure shows the OLS estimates of the Engel curves as specified in equation (3) in the text, separately for 
wage/salary workers (solid line) and the self employed (dashed line).  We evaluate both curves at the sample means of the 
demographic control for the pooled sample.  The estimated intercepts for the self employed and the wage/salary workers, 
respectively, are 4.73 and 4.29.  The estimated slopes for each group, respectively, are 0.38 and 0.40.  The sample for each 


















Figure 3:  Relationship Between Total Family Money and Food Expenditure, PSID 
 
Panel A:  OLS Estimation 
 
Notes:  This figure shows the OLS estimates of the Engel curves as specified in equation (3) in the text, separately for 
wage/salary workers (solid line) and the self employed (dashed line).  We evaluate both curves at the sample means of the 
demographic control for the pooled sample.  The estimated intercepts for the self employed and the wage/salary workers, 
respectively, are 6.18 and 5.18.  The estimated slopes for each group, respectively, are 0.24 and 0.32.  The sample for each 
specification are the same as the ones described in the notes to Table 1.  
 
Panel B:  IV Estimation 
 
Notes:  This figure shows the OLS estimates of the Engel curves as specified in equation (3) in the text, separately for 
wage/salary workers (solid line) and the self employed (dashed line).  We evaluate both curves at the sample means of the 
demographic control for the pooled sample.  The estimated intercepts for the self employed and the wage/salary workers, 
respectively, are 5.47 and 5.23.  The estimated slopes for each group, respectively, are 0.31 and 0.32.  The sample for each 



















Figure 4:  Estimates of the Underreporting of Income By Self Employed Over Time, CEX Data 
 
 
Notes:  This table shows the estimates of underreporting (1-κ) by year using the CEX data (IV specification) where 
nondurable income is the expenditure measure and total family money is the income measure.  To get these 
estimates, we re-estimated equation (8) including year dummies interacted with the self employed dummy.  Robust 
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Appendix Figure A1 - The Average Marginal Tax Rate in the U.S. 
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